What is a Superpower Today?

1. The Shifting Global Order and the Question of Change

The contemporary world is undergoing a period of significant rupture and restructuring. The present situation, as evidenced by the maturation of the current conjuncture, indicates that a significant, multidimensional and radical change is imminent.

Theories concerning the manner in which the world is undergoing change represent a major theme within the domain of political thought. While some theorists advocate for gradual and evolutionary change, those who emphasize qualitative and revolutionary transformations have dominated the political discourse until recently. The theme of change can be analyzed from a variety of perspectives, including those of the history of political thought, the field of international relations, and the concrete manifestation of this in geopolitics.

One of the thinkers who has addressed the issue of the ongoing transformation of the world system is George Friedman. Friedman has been a consistent proponent of a model of "cyclicality" for some time. In an article on Geopolitical Futures website he is discussing this model, which he developed mainly for the United States, the thinker writes that the country "goes through political cycles every 50 years, and the crisis period at the end of the last cycle in the 1970s resolved itself in the early 1980s". Friedman explains that there are essentially two types of cycles: institutional cycles and socio-economic cycles, according to his model. These cycles are realised in periods of 50 and 80 years. The author discusses his moden (in the same site) historical and economic terms and makes various predictions based on this model. One of the authors who thinks about change is Uluç Özülker, a retired ambassador and statesman. In his book "Küresel Düzende Oyun Devam Ediyor" (The Game Continues in the Global Order- 2017: 13-57), Özülker argues that there have been three fundamental changes or breaking points in the process from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) to the present day. These breakpoints took on the character of radical transformation with the French Revolution and subsequent international events. If a simple calculation is made on the basis of Özülker's writings, it seems possible to see that these breaking points were realised in periods of one hundred years. If we analyse political history, we can see that these periods are based on a realistic approach. As a matter of fact, the author of these lines believes that today we are facing an international conjuncture in which an important breaking point, which can only be seen in periods of one hundred years, has manifested itself.

2. From Unipolarity to Multipolarity: The Rise of New Alliances

The present rupture can be traced back to the sudden and unforeseen dissolution of the Soviet Union and its allies in 1991. The term "disintegration" is employed deliberately, given that the conjuncture was sudden and no major world power was prepared for it. Indeed, had the Soviet Union not disintegrated on its own, there was no power capable of disintegrating it. This was due to the fact that it had advanced technology and nuclear weapons, a strong military and its economic problems were solvable. However, the Russian political elite opted for a path of integration with the West by embracing international capitalism. Consequently, this voluntary choice resulted in the gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union from its highest echelons to its lowest. The geostrategic consequences of this disintegration remain unresolved, as it is important to recognise that the order was established through war and that the relations in question were constructed on contradictions that were resolved through conflict. The two great world wars of the past century have had a profound impact on global integration, first through the process of war and subsequently through the process of reintegration. Indeed, as a consequence of these wars, the balance of power shifted from the original "superpower" centred in England. The establishment of the League of Nations, and subsequently the United Nations system, marked a significant development in the global governance landscape. It is evident that this institutional-structural equilibrium did not ensure a wholly conflict-free world. Nevertheless, the approach was predicated on the premise that conflicts could be managed and resolved at the institutional level, and that contradictions and disagreements could be settled without provoking a new world war. The existence of two equivalent superpowers armed with nuclear technology capable of total destruction and their allies, which was the classical meaning of superpower, helped to maintain the balance of necessities. Indeed, even today, at the doctrinal level, Sergei Karaganov is able to articulate the position that Russia sees no harm in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In an interview with the Russian Foreign Affairs Magazine, Karaganov stated: The establishment of a multilateral nuclear deterrence system on a global scale is of interest. Consequently, from a personal standpoint, the emergence of new nuclear powers and the strengthening of existing ones is not a cause for concern. This is due to the fact that it is an ineffective strategy to rely on the intelligence of the general populace. There must be fear". The prevailing world order of the preceding century was similarly sustained by the spectre of nuclear annihilation until its conclusion. It is evident that this is not a favourable option for human development. Nevertheless, it is a demonstrable fact that the human species survived and reached the new millennium without facing total extinction.

Time is an important variable, but it does not determine everything on its own. Moreover, it is a misconception to claim that time works equally for everyone. Time works in favor of the powerful.

The magnitude and severity of the disruption to the prevailing political order invariably corresponds to the complexity and difficulty of the ensuing process. This is due to the fact that such radical change processes require extensive restructuring in many areas and complex, time-consuming planning. For instance, the political atmosphere of the last century resulted in the establishment of the Bretton Woods system. Subsequent welfare era policies, predicated primarily on the macroeconomic perspectives of John Maynard Keynes, engendered a robust middle class, a comprehensive welfare state, and a certain equilibrium between the global system and nation states. This period is often regarded as having produced some of the most accomplished citizens in history, while concurrently ensuring an acceptable standard of living. The Keynesian economic policies of the time entailed the imposition of high taxes on citizens in return for an education system characterised by equal opportunities, a healthcare system characterised by quality and accessibility, adequate housing for all, and adequate nutrition for all. A further salient aspect of these policies is that they serve to protect the purchasing power of the currency by counteracting inflation. The employment and price-balancing mechanisms were effective in stabilising Europe's economic landscape over an extended period. Indeed, it is evident that one of the most significant experiences to be recalled in the present context is that of the Keynesian economic policies in question. This order was able to be maintained until the 1970s, when capitalism encountered a period of decline due to the oil crisis. However, with the advent of the recession and the subsequent decline in profits, capitalism entered a period of worldwide restructuring. One of the most significant pillars of the international order was decommissioned in the 1980s, with the withdrawal of the state from public investments, the elimination of its supportive and social functions, and the removal of legal and political obstacles to large capital investments. It is arguably accurate to assert that this public understanding disappeared with the dissolution of the bipolar world. Nevertheless, the dissolution of these policies and the uncontrollable crises engendered by financialisation have resulted in significant inequalities across the globe and have not fundamentally eradicated warfare. Conversely, radicalism and fascism have emerged, while the populace's educational attainment has regressed. Despite the technological advancements, there has been a precipitous decline in the quality of life. A plethora of additional crisis dynamics have come to the fore, and it can be argued that the initial phase of global expansion has been brought to a halt by the recent pandemic of the novel coronavirus.

The ideal of a unified global community, characterised by peace and the pursuit of truth, is a concept that resonates with individuals of sound mind. Nevertheless, the imposition of the globalisation process on a unipolar and hegemonic plane, and through armed violence, has resulted in significant inequalities and victimisation on a global scale. In regions such as the Middle East, Latin America, the Balkans and Central Asia, armed conflicts and regional disputes have resulted in significant loss of life, displacement of populations and restrictions on access to basic necessities such as food and water. A considerable proportion of the population, unable to reap the rewards of development and prosperity, has revolted against this inequality. The unravelling of political regimes was a phenomenon that was observed in a number of instances, with a succession of hybrid and eclectic political regimes subsequently emerging. The dissolution of centralised political unions has given rise to the emergence of autonomous regions and centres characterised by a absence of state sovereignty. These regions have become favourable testing grounds for radicalism and armed violence. The consequences of these actions have been far-reaching, with mass unemployment, poverty, housing, nutrition and resulting health problems emerging as key issues. The principle of exclusion from the globalisation process can be articulated as follows.

As a generation that came of age in an era characterised by the welfare state, we were acutely aware of the significant disparities we encountered during this period. Consequently, we adopted a critical stance towards these inequalities, recognising our collective responsibility to address them. The old world had passed into obsolescence. The impact of this phenomenon is challenging to articulate. Despite the gradual nature of the change, it was in fact rapid and pervasive, extending beyond the economic infrastructure. Consequently, value judgements and behavioural patterns underwent a rapid and comparable transformation. The consequences of this transformation on human values, collective consciousness and behavioural patterns were so sudden and profound that those unable to adapt to this process were rapidly marginalised. Indeed, it appears that the ideological repercussions of the process have resulted in a more profound and irreversible harm.

The world has struggled to overcome the geopolitical catastrophe caused by the collapse of the USSR. 

Concrete developments have now demonstrated that the so-called globalisation process has not been executed in a fair and inclusive manner, and that it tends to evolve into a unipolar hegemony. This situation appears to have been acquiesced by the primary actors of the process. As an alternative to this, measures such as organising the world in a more balanced and multipolar manner, making other rising global powers, especially China, a component of integration, and making international organisations more effective are among the main initiatives put forward in this new process. Indeed, the issue of multipolarity has recently resurfaced on the agenda, as evidenced by the Kazan summit of the BRICS, which was established under the leadership of Russia and China. The present study seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by offering a definition of this alternative great power centre, which is still in its early stages of development, and by exploring its objectives. This complexity is, however, a deliberate feature of the initiative, as the active forces are seeking to establish a pragmatic and flexible field of action that can adapt to the evolving challenges of the process. It is also possible to offer a concise characterisation of the BRICS countries as 'victims of globalisation'. This is due to the hypothesis that the countries which have lost their former position and power as a result of the globalisation process and are outside of existing alliance systems are leading the way in this process. Russia is a leading nation in this regard. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia's aspirations for integration into the capitalist system and its international alliances were thwarted. Consequently, the nation opted to explore alternative avenues for integration by reevaluating its established alliance relations and networks.

3. Ideological Underpinnings of the New Geopolitics

As previously discussed, it can be posited that multipolarity, a proposed alternative to unipolar globalisation, is founded on a form of reactionary movement that assembles countries with comparatively underdeveloped political, economic and technological infrastructures in a diverse and unorthodox manner. Indeed, the absence of a clearly defined vision, membership policy, set of goals and objectives of BRICS is attributable to this approach. It is not possible to encounter a clear and unambiguous approach to the fundamental problems concerning the future of humanity. Furthermore, the criteria by which countries are or are not granted membership remain opaque. The nature of partnerships to be established with member countries, the specific fields in which they will operate, and the manner in which member countries' populations will benefit from human development, welfare, and any advantages to be provided to members, are also not clearly defined. The principles of "respect for sovereign rights" and "non-interference in internal affairs", which are frequently emphasised in these centres, are of a very pragmatic and reactive nature. Nevertheless, these are also the fundamental principles on which this union is based. The objective of these principles is to provide support to countries that were left to the dominance of the capitalist world following the Cold War, some of which underwent dismantling and some of which underwent a shift in political regime, and to regress the other side by providing support to countries on the periphery of this hegemonic sphere, irrespective of their political regime.

Indeed, the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, which are based on this centre, function in fact to gain influence over countries by supporting various centres of reaction and to use such backward relations to push back the opposing pole. For instance, Russia's and China's relations with Taliban, the establishment of such a relationship with Afghanistan by the former Sandinist Daniel Ortega at Russia's suggestion, and Iran's exploitation of this principle to defend its repressive and theocratic style of government are clear examples. Furthermore, condoning or indirectly supporting the armed violence of radical organisations in the name of anti-imperialism is also part of this global strategy. However, it is evident that the fundamental issue underpinning this process is not anti-imperialism, but rather a contest for global dominance and leadership. It is evident that in order to cultivate this struggle, there is an endeavour to establish a concentration of power by degeneration of the concepts that were valid in the last century.

Today we are experiencing an ugly period in which interests are expressed without ideology.

Alexander Dugin, a Russian strategist, recently published an article entitled "The Deep State". Dugin is a prominent and founding theorist of the Russian branch of Eurasianism, and he also holds a PhD in political science. It is reasonable to assert that he possesses significant connections and influence within the national context. Until fairly recently, Dugin's interest in diverse forms of thought was evident, and there was no need for him to conceal this interest. These include mysticism, metaphysical philosophy and nihilism. Dugin's intellectual influences include Rudolf Steiner, Nietzsche and Heidegger, and he has been known to openly challenge the Western roots of the Enlightenment and humanism. Furthermore, he frequently employs Slavic nationalist slogans such as "the third Rome" and makes statements in favour of Russia's imperial mission. It is unnecessary to reiterate the profound humanitarian crisis instigated by the philosophers referenced by the thinker in 1930s Germany, a crisis that transcended national borders, spreading globally. However, the development and propagation of such synthetic ideologies by individuals who are pragmatic enough to openly declare a change in ideology on three separate occasions is indicative of a particular phenomenon. This signifies that the ideological fortification of one of the most perilous forms of political reaction is underway and will be sustained by all available means. By pursuing this course of action, Russia is not only jeopardising the stability of the region, but also estranging the modern Turks, with whom it shares a profound cultural affinity and who have played a significant role in its development. This social group represents the most sophisticated, elite and creative segment of Turkish society, and exerts a significant degree of influence.

Returning to the subject, Alexander Dugin, in his article The Deep State, discusses the examples of "deep states" in Turkey and worldwide, and states that they stand as obstacles to multipolarity, that these forces have nothing to do with democracy, and that they are actually a kind of elite organisation. Although he does not explicitly state it, he states that these elite forces are actually the instruments of Western hegemony in the world, and that the elite Kemalists are nothing else than this. In light of this analysis, the response to these forces is to unconditionally support any alternative power centres that are in opposition to them. Indeed, from the standpoint of safeguarding the geostrategic interests of his own country, Dugin's actions can be considered commendable. For the great powers, the political regimes of states, the conditions under which their peoples live, and their level of economic and human development are of no consequence. The focus of their analysis is on the relationship of interest that has been established with the political powers of other countries, as perceived from an external perspective. Consequently, the objective is to formulate the most ingenious theories possible, with the aim of establishing vassal states that are dependent on the Russian mainland and unified around a shared ideological belief. The issue that is not fully comprehensible is the manner in which individuals, who have been influenced by the theoretical works of prominent theorists, perceive and interpret global phenomena without engaging in critical analysis. For instance, it is not conceivable for us to deviate from the objective of modern civilisation that Atatürk demonstrated. However, this is precisely the position proposed by Dugin and the elites with whom he is associated.

It is imperative to acknowledge that this initiative by Dugin is an indispensable aspect of the pursuit of great-power status. At this juncture in the present article, the issue of the definition of the term "great power" or, as indicated by the title, "superpower" is raised, and this is the issue to which attention is to be drawn.

A recently published article by the strategist George Friedman offers a thought-provoking exploration of the concept of superpower and the manner in which this notion ought to be approached. Friedman's argument is that the concept of a 'superpower' cannot be measured in the traditional classical sense, that is to say, in the sense employed at the conclusion of the Second World War, by the possession of a nuclear arsenal capable of global destruction. He contends that this definition is somewhat outdated and that the concept of a 'superpower' should be considered in a much more expansive and diverse manner in the contemporary era. This assertion is also, it can be argued, correct. This approach posits that the concept of a superpower should not be confined exclusively to the domains of military-technological and nuclear armament capacity. It is imperative to acknowledge the overarching influence that this power must possess. This is primarily the superpower's capacity to exert influence over the mental domains of individuals inhabiting the rest of the world. Consequently, it is feasible to conceptualise Russia as a superpower in the literal sense. The entity in question has the capacity to manage the psychological dimension inherent to the process of struggle to which it is a party.

Written by Onur Aydemir

November 2024, Ankara